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THE ELEMENT OF MALICE IN THE LAW OF
LIBEL IN CONNECTICUT.
Chief Justice Swift, in his digest of the laws of Connecticut
published in the year 1822, gives the following definition: "A
libel is a malicious defamation in printing or writing, by signs or
pictures, tending to injure the reputation of another; and every-
thing written or published concerning another which renders him
ridiculous, exposes him to public hatred or contempt and tends to
hinder mankind from associating with him is actionable." The
object of this article is to inquire into the meaning of the term
"malicious" in the above definition. A thorough understanding
of the meaning of this term is most important, as it is really the
basis of the whole law of libel. The other elements that go to
make it up are comparatively simple,-the fact of the printing or
writing, and the nature of the charge, for instance,-but the
element of malice is not so easily understood or proved.
Of course the word "malice" in ordinary conversation has a
certain definite and well-defined meaning that everybody under-
stands. It is pretty nearly equivalent to hatred, ill-will or spite,
and when it is said that a man acts maliciously the meaning is that
he acts with the deliberate intention of injuring some one. Where
it is possible to prove the existence of this state of mind, with the
other necessary facts, it is sufficient to support an action for libel.
It is, of course, difficult to arrive at this result directly, because
the matter lies entirely in the mind of the person charged, and
therefore his own admission is the only direct evidence attainable.
But there are many facts, the existence of which will raise a pre-
sumption that malice was present in the mind of the defendant, as
for instance, such previous relations between the parties as would
naturally cause him to have a desire for revenge. Acts and
declarations of the defendant tending to prove that he desired to
injure the plaintiff would also be admissible. There has been
some doubt as to whether evidence of a subsequent repetition of
the libel is admissible for any purpose when there is a count in the
declaration embracing it. There is a series of five or six decisions
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on this point, the last of which is Ward v. Dick (47 Conn. 300),
and it seems to be now pretty well settled that such evidence is
admissible, but only for the purpose of showing the defendant's
malice at the time he made the charge declared on, and not as a
ground for the recovery of additional damages.
The presumption arising from the proof of the above facts may
be rebutted by the defendant, and the absence of malice estab-
lished, by showing that he had an honest and well-founded belief
in the truth of the charge, and that he was actuated by a proper
motive in making it, as for example, a desire to protect the pub-
lic against the depredations of a thief or forger. It is a curious
fact that the right to plead the truth of a claimed libel as a defense
is secured by the constitution of this State (Article I., Section 7).
We may notice in passing that this insertion of a provision of this
nature in the fundamental law of the State is one of the earliest
examples of tendency to depart from the original theory of the
nature of a constitution which has grown to surprising proportions
of late years, especially in the West.
It is of course, a self-evident fact that the publication of a false
and scandalous charge against a man by a person who bears him
no especial ill-will may injure him just as much in his reputation
and feelings as it would do if the motive for the publication had
been the most malignant malice, in the sense in which I have
heretofore used the term. The courts have always recognized
this fact, and therefore they have given a somewhat extended and
technical meaning to the term "malice" as used in actions for
libel, which it is important to remember. Thus it was gradually
established by judicial opinions that malice might be iuferred from
the simple fact that the charge was false. And if the defendant
knew that the charge was false when he made it, and was actuated
by improper and unjustifiable motives, or if he manifested indif-
ference as to the effect the charge might have on the reputation
of the plaintiff, and refused to retract it when requested, all these
facts might be shown to strengthen the inference.
In actions for libel the plaintiff might recover for damages in
two ways. First, actual damages, such as might accrue from the
loss of employment as a direct result from the publication of the
libel, and second, general damages, which were supposed to com-
pensate him for the injury to his reputation and feelings. Actual
damages had to be specially alleged and proved, but as it was
difficult to prove general damages, their existence was inferred,
and their amount generally depended on the character of the
charge, and the motives which actuated the defendant in making it.
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Until the year 1855 the law of libel in Connecticut was devel-
oped by judicial opinions pretty nearly upon the lines of the
common law and up to that time there were no enactments upon
the subject with the exception of the constitutional provision I
have referred to. But in that year a statute was passed which, at
first sight, appears to introduce a radical change in the law of
malice in actions for libel, though as I shall show by an examin-
ation of the decisions on this act, the change is not as great as at
first sight appears. The act in question is in the following
words:
"In every action for alleged libel the defendant may give
proof of intention, and unless the plaintiff shall prove malice in
fact, he shall recover nothing but his actual damage proved and
specially alleged in his declaration."
Another act on the subject was passed in 1872 which it is not
necessary to consider here, and which was incorporated in the
above act in the revision of 1875. These provisions have been
retained in our statute law, and may be found in the revision of
i888, Sec. ii6.
At this distance of time it is of course impossible to discover
anything as to the history of this statute, that is, who drafted it,
and what his purpose was in obtaining its enactment. But in the
decisions which are hereafter referred to it is said that it was
intended solely as a protection to the publishers of newspapers
who printed statements merely as items of current news, and
with no intention of {njuring anyone. If this is the truth about
the intention of the draftsman, it is a very good example of how
not to draw a statute, for a cursory examination of the wording
will show that it is very much more far-reaching than it was
intended to be. Judge Ellsworth seemed to have a pretty decided
idea as to the undesirability of this act, for in his opinion in the
first case in which it came under the notice of the Supreme Court
(Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14), he says: "As we have inti-
mated, the law of libel was well enough as it stood before, and
since it is a subject of peculiar difficulty and delicacy for legisla-
tion, it should be let alone, unless the evil suffered is very great,
and that evil is (not) susceptible of a certain and equitable
remedy."
The two cases in which this statute has been construed are
Moore v. Stevenson (supra), and Hotchkiss v. Porter, 30 Conn.
414. These are the leading cases on the subject, although the
statute is referxed to and commented on in nearly all the subse-
quent decisions on libel, and they will fully repay a most careful
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examination by anyone who desires to be informed on the law of
this subject. It was claimed by the defendant in the first of the
above cases that the act was to be so construed as to justify any
publication however false and generally injurious, if the defendant
believed the charge to be true, and if the plaintiff could not prove
the existence of hatred, spite or ill-will towards him. It must be
admitted that the wording of the statute will bear this construc-
tion, and even that it would be the usual and natural meaning of
the words. But the court dissents from this view in the strongest
possible language, holdifig in the first place that such a construc-
tion would be contrary to the constitutional provision that "all
courts are to be open to grant redress for every injury to the
person, property or reputation," and that even if it were not uncon-
stitutional it would be the grossest kind of a violation of the right
of every citizen to protect his good name and reputation, since it
would make it dependent on the mere belief of anyone who
desired to attack it, and it would be impossible to prove that the
defendant did not honestly believe the charge, if he simply took
the trouble to swear that he did. The construction that the court
did put upon the statute is best stated in the second of the above
opinions (Hotchkiss v. Porter, 30 Conn. 414), where on page 421
the court says:
, The phrase I malice infact' is a technical one, and as the common law
stood before the passage of the act of 1855, did not mean malignity, spite or
hatred, but improper and unjustifiable motive; and such the court held was its
meaning in the law in question. And they further held that all that the legis-
lature had said thereby, or could constitutionally say, was, that the defendant
in all cases might prove that his motives were proper and justifiable, within
the well settled principles of the common law, and that the plaintiff, in order
to the recovery of general damages, should show, by other evidence than mere
legal presumption from the fact of publication, that the motives of the defend-
ant were not proper aid justifiable. By that decision (Moore v. Stevenson,
sufira) it was settled that under the act the right of the plaintiff to recover
general damages shall not depend upon the mere legal presumption of improper
and unjustifiable motive, 'derived from the fact of publishing that which is
untrue, but upon the question whether such improper and unjustifiable motive
has been proved or disproved as a matter of fact by the evidence adduced for
that purpose on the trial; that the legislature did not intend to prescribe any
new rule as to the kind or degree of malice, or as to the character or kind of
evidence by which the existence of improper and unjustifiable motive should
be proved; that all that they intended was that the fact of improper and unjus-
tifiable motive should appear in proof, and not be presumed; but whether in
proof from the character of the libel, the res gestaT or circumstances attending
its preparation and publication, or from evidence of other facts tending to
show the real motive of the publisher, they did not intend to say; and that
upon that construction the act was not invalid."
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From this it will be seen that the law on this subject was not
much changed by the statute of 1855 after all, the only difference
being that now the plaintiff must prove an additional fact, which
is easily susceptible of proof if it really exists, though the last part
of the extract quoted seems to intimate that if the libel and the
circumstances of its publication are peculiarly outrageous, malice
may be proved by that fact alone, in much the same manner that
it might have been inferred from it before the statute was passed.
Arthur Perkins.
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